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The United States has and has had an ambivalent attitűdé toward 
composition and rhetoric. During the 1992 election former President Bush 
charged that then-candidate Clinton gave the impression that America 
was in a State of decline, bút Bush ürgéd voters to “look beneath the 
rhetoric and look at the facts” (“Bush, Clinton,” A4). Bush wasn’t alone 
in conjuring up an image of a menacing rhetoric. Clinton said that what 
he offered was “a partnership—nőt rhetoric, nőt hot speeches, nőt cheap 
thirty-second television ads, bút a true partnership (“MSU” Al). From 
both of these quotations rhetoric appears is clearly assumed to be 
deceitful. According to Bush, it is the antithesis of “facts”; to Clinton it is 
the equivalent of “hot speeches” and “cheap ... ads.” He offers truth, a 
“true partnership.”
And yet the language of politics is replete with the vocabulary of 
classical rhetoric. Dávid Broder recently quoted Richard Lamm as stating 
that Clinton is “demagoguing the Medicare issue.” Broder alsó suggests 
that the presence of Ross Perot in the coming election makes it difficult 
fór Dole to “attack ... Clinton’s character” (EZ). Aristotle couldn’t have 
said it better. The crass emotional appeal represented by the “demagogue” 
is heaped upon the assault on Clinton’s ethical appeal. Both criticisms 
suggest that Clinton’s message should be disregarded because of its 
reliance on pure emotion and on Clinton’s poor character.
Intő this discussion we alsó have the fact that composition or 
oratory, the heirs of classical rhetoric, have been mandatory courses of 
study fór incoming American university students fór one-hundred years at 
least. Albert Kitzhaber traces the beginnings of composition to Harvard 
University during the 1860s and 70s and notes that it is codified in 
Harvard’s catalogue in 1874 and requires students to write “a short
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English Composition, correct in spelling, grammar, and expression...” 
(qtd. in Kitzhaber 35). Scholars at Harvard thought that incoming students 
were deficient in writing skills, and in 1891 a committee undertook to 
study the “composition and rhetoric problem” (qtd. in Kitzhaber 44). In 
fact, this committee blamed the underpreparation of students on primary 
and secondary schools, advocating that these institutions focus on 
composition. However, the committee’s suggestion was one that 
continues to embroil composition scholars: that these schools focus on 
teaching the rigors of good grammar, proper style, and mechanical 
correctness, thus allowing Harvard to engage in its “true purpose— 
advanced education”—in Kitzhaber’s words (45).
Fred Newton Scott at the University of Michigan thought that the 
report with its insistence on language correctness was misguided, and 
suggested that it aimed to raise the standard of composition “by the hair 
of the head” (qtd. in Kitzhaber 47). This conflict, then, leads to the Central 
problem of composition and rhetoric in schools: whether its role is to 
inculcate proper and correct language or whether its role is something 
else, something more. Scott gives a concise view of his view, at least, of 
the role of composition. Writing in 1909 in an article called “What the 
West Wants in Preparatory English” (remember that Michigan was 
considered the West then) Scott notes that
It is of course necessary that our young people should spell and 
punctuate properly, should make the verb agree with its subject, use 
words in their dictionary senses, and write sentences that can be read 
aloud without causing unnecessary pain to the mandibles... Bút these 
matters ... are subsidiary
... a means to an end... The main purpose of training in composition is 
free speech, direct and sincere communion with our fellows, that swift 
and untrammeled exchange of opinion, feeling, and experience which is 
the working instrument of the social instinct, and the motive power of 
our civilization.
(qtd. in Stewart 39)
What Scott is talking about here is the job of Citizen, and much of 
what we as educators do is train students fór that job. Histórián Paul 
Gagnon has a similar view in his essay “Why Study History.” He argues 
that history helps inculcate powers of “judgement” in individuals in a 
democratic society fór what he calls “the profession of Citizen, which like 
it or nőt, exercise it or nőt, we are born intő” (43). Now, the term 
“democracy” is always a tricky one, and tends to be defined in cliches or
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in political terms. Fór the present I would like to adapt a definition used 
by Dániel Boorstin, which is a System “govemed by a spirit of equality 
and dominated by the desire ... to give everything to everybody” (153). 
To that definition I would add a system that believes in publicly providing 
all ideas and data to all citizens. And that ourjobs as educators is often to 
impart to students the means by which they can manage and use the 
conflicting ideas and information that they face. The job of citizen is 
demanding, requiring us to actively undertake our right and obligation to 
participate in public discourse, which should nőt be defined simply as 
political dialogue. Public discourse is in an ongoing conversation, both 
órai and written, between citizens about public issues: social, political, 
cultural, academic, commercial, scientific. Composition and rhetoric give 
students the tools to participate, to undertake their new profession, and to 
actively analyze and create the arguments—the use of specific evidence to 
support disputable positions—and information that characterize public 
life.
Composition and rhetoric in this citizen-building sense has a long 
history. Textbooks show that rhetoric developed in Greece of the fifth 
Century BC in Sicily and that it developed out of individual citizens’ 
needs to personally litigate property disputes. In fact, by the time of 
Aristotle’s Rhetoric. the three main arenas of a citizen’s public discourse 
are identified: law courts, politics, and ceremonies. Representatives were 
nőt “hired” to plead citizens’ cases, argue their votes, or eulogize their 
passing ancestors. Citizens had no choice bút participation. This is nőt to 
yeam fór somé Golden Age. We have to remember that citizenship then 
was nőt universal; that women were nőt citizens; that “foreigners” were 
nőt afforded any rights of citizenship; and that even Aristotle takes care to 
discuss the merits of using torture fór the testimony of slaves (1,1376b ff). 
However, we can adopt somé principles, the chief one of which is that 
truth is nőt universal. It is probable. Aristotle forthrightly admits that a 
probability is nőt the truth, bút rather “what happens fór the most part ... 
among things that can be other than they are” (I, 1357a. 16). We can only 
imagine those citizens arguing their property rights without deeds, or 
court registers, or bilis of sale, or land surveys.
The importance of probability Aristotle’s Rhetoric is underscored 
by James Kinneavy who notes that
the humán Sciences ... involve the contingent, the variable, that
changeable, and therefore the free... Politics, ethics, [and] rhetoric ...
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enable us to change somé aspect of our life and therefore we can 
deliberate about the ways we may choose to effect the change. (76)
The implication fór the task of citizen is clear. We have access to 
large amounts of data, somé of which is true, or accurate, somé of which 
is nőt true. Somé information is biased from its source or exists only in 
remnants (remember Clinton’s mention of “cheap thirty-second television 
ads"). Nevertheless, citizens have to engage that information, find 
patterns in it, assess its truth or usefulness, create informed arguments that 
explain that information, and then work publicly to persuade other 
citizens to accept that interpretation—in the face of many competing 
interpretations. The end, of course, is action—casting a vote, signing a 
contract, making a manifesto, arguing one’s way out of a traffic citation, 
or—particularly in the case of students—getting a grade.
Of course, students don’t ask about Aristotle’s position on probable 
truth very often, and yet the capacity to analyze and craft arguments is 
necessary, particularly when viewing two or more disparate arguments 
that are based on the same or similar data. It’s too simplistic to State that 
if one citizen holds a position different from ours, then that person must 
be wrong-headed, misguided, immoral, or mentally inept. This presents a 
good question: How can two individuals, using the same evidence, which 
we have already said is largely based on probabilities, come to completely 
different points of view? Stephen Tuolmin in The Uses of Argument 
provides an effective model. He suggests—and what follows is an 
abbreviated version of his complete model—that we develop our claims 
(or what he calls “conclusions”) based on data that is bound together in 
the face of “warrants” that act as “bridges [that] authorise the sort of step 
to which our particular argument commits us” (98). Tuolmin further 
discusses the natúré of both data and warrants by stating the “data are 
appealed to explicitly, warrants implicitly ... warrants are generál ... and 
have accordingly to be established in quite a different way from the facts 
[that] we produce as data” (100). Tuolmin depicts this relationship in the 
following diagram:
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Tuolmin’s Argumentation Scheme
DATA CLAIM
Details/Support
“Facts”
Evidence
Specifics
Conclusion
Thesis
Generalizations 
Disputable position
WARRANT
Another way of looking at warrants is to view them as assumptions 
that we hold, assumptions that we adopt from a number of sources: 
culture, political background, personal history, gender, family, religion, 
etc. These assumptions are responsible fór different claims, even when 
working with the same data. Fór example, it was recently reported (Grand 
Rapids Press) that people living in the Himalayas have developed hearts 
that qualitatively process oxygen differently from those of people who 
live in less lofty altitudes, their hearts, in fact, burning glucose rather than 
fatty acids. This seems to me to qualify as a fact. However, two distinct 
claims may be made fór these data. A group of scientists or anthropo- 
logists who make their livings by tracing the events of evolution may 
make the claim evolution works. However, a group of fundamentálist 
Christians, fór instance, who specifically have a creationist view of 
humán development and who forthrightly reject evolution would probably 
reject this claim, perhaps citing the data as showing biological 
“adaptation.” Evolution is nőt just a scientific theory. Whether they 
understand it completely or nőt, individuals have definite views on the 
subject; it is a topic of public policy in schools as well as churches. And 
as citizens, we need to understand how warrants work to create the 
arguments of public life.
Someone might ask “Why composition?” “Why writing?” “Can’t 
we discuss the work of citizens in other classes such as history?” “And 
can’t we teach the formation of arguments in speech classes?” Certainly 
such disciplines undertake the task of educating citizens, and taught well, 
they often depend on students’ command of written discourse. However,
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the study of composition, of writing down our data and claims, of using 
the former to develop the latter, makes our positions piain, allows us to 
refine those positions, and frees us—after having made an artifact of our 
argument—to speculate on the assumptions that are responsible fór our 
public thoughts. Composition is a deliberate act. We have to choose our 
words, aiming at particular purposes and audiences, contemplating the 
acceptance or rejection of our views, meeting notions already held by an 
audience, and meeting objections, determining the most effective order 
fór our thoughts. Of course, we alsó have to pay attention to matters of 
grammar, spelling, sentence structure, style, and all of the other details of 
linguistic correctness. Peter Elbow suggests that by writing, we free our 
minds fór more thinking. He writes that thoughts and feelings “play round 
in our heads and continue play round and round” (288). Once on paper or 
on a computer screen, though, those thoughts “have a piacé ... they evolve 
intő another thought or even fade away. Writing is a way to get what is 
inside one’s head outside, on paper, so there’s room fór more” (288). If 
composition can help us as citizens accomplish the task of refining our 
visions and allowing us to have more, or alternate, visions, then it 
performs a powerful role in free societies by becoming, as Elbow 
suggests, a kind of “cognitive savagery” (290).
The previous discussion should nőt be construed as meaning that 
composition and rhetoric are without critics. The Laté James Berlin, fór 
example, notes in Rhetoric and Realitv that “every rhetorical system is 
based on epistemological assumptions (my italics) about the natúré of 
reality, the natúré of the knower, and the rules governing the discovery 
and communication of the known” (4). In other words, any rhetorical 
system is loaded with its own idealogy ("Ideology” 477). Berlin is 
particularly concerned with what he calls “Current Traditional” rhetoric 
that assumes that reality is “objective” and is “located in the matériái 
world"; this rhetoric is found in classrooms that emphasize mechanical 
correctness and linguistic precision. He claims that this model was 
developed by universities in the laté nineteenth century as a means of 
servicing an emerging managerial eláss, which had “a naive faith ... that 
[their] economical and political interests ... were ... inherent features of 
the universe” (Realitv 37). Berlin further claims that this eláss uses its 
rhetoric and the language in which it is couched as a means of preserving 
its “privileged status” (37). Before his death, Berlin favored a “social- 
epistemic” rhetoric, one that is based on an interaction of individuals 
within a discourse community, one in which new truths and realities are
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developed in this free interchange. Such a model “views knowledge as an 
aréna of ideological conflict: there are no arguments from transcendent 
truth since all arguments arise in ideology” ("Ideology” 489).
Such a view of composition and rhetoric does nőt reject the notion 
of using precise language. (Berlin was masterful in his writing—and 
mechanically very correct.) Bút it does foster a view of free individuals 
grappling with important issues under uncertain, probablistic 
circumstances, searching fór a workable truth. In other words, individuals 
working as citizens.
Richard Rodriguez explains that as a young boy he was forced to 
leam English and his parents made to use English in their home even 
though Spanish was their language. Spanish represented fór him the 
priváté, home world, and English represented the open and public life that 
he entered as a result of his graduate education. He notes that his new 
public language in his new (and largely academic) world “allow[ed] those 
of us from other cultures to deal with each other in a mass society” and 
thus had “a profound political impact” (404).
Rodriguez’s experience is nőt atypical. Education may be 
considered a process by which the individual becomes a public person, 
taking on the rights and obligations of participating in public discourse. 
Composition and rhetoric, viewed as tools in helping us become citizens, 
help in this process. Chaim Perelman suggests the following the role fór 
rhetoric:
... let us recast our philosophy in terms of a vision in which people and 
humán societies are in interaction and are solely responsible fór their 
cultures, their institutions, and their future—a vision in which people try 
hard to elaborate reasonable Systems, imperfect bút perfectible. (Realm
160)
In our times we have all seen systems in which citizens have had no 
or very little opportunity to participate in their legitimate public 
discourses. When citizens do nőt, cannot, or will nőt participate in a 
system such as the one envisioned by Perelman, they lose the rights and 
obligations of citizens—with all the imperfection that that implies. Rather 
than deciding fór themselves the courses of their lives, the public things 
of their lives are either done fór them or to them.
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